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The charitable nonprofit sector is in a state of financial distress.
Although Congress has maintained the tax-advantaged status of
nonprofit organizations, it has taken no affirmative steps to relieve
the crisis. This Current Topic proposes that the federal govern-
ment help ease the financial burdens of the charitable nonprofit sec-
tor by providing a new tax incentive that encourages individuals to
lend to charities.' Such a tax incentive would be an effective means
of addressing the financial distress of the charitable nonprofit sector
and is justified by several theories that support the existing tax sta-
tus of this sector.2
Part I of this Current Topic discusses the causes of the current
crisis and reveals the inadequacy of the present tax structure for
meeting the financial needs of the charitable nonprofit sector. Part
II provides a rationale for a tax incentive for lending to charities.
Part III introduces and examines three possible schemes for such a
tax incentive.
L The Financial Distress of the Nonprofit Sector
A. Sources of the Crisis
The financial condition of the nonprofit sector demonstrates the
need for greater incentives in support of charitable organizations.
In the late 1970s inflation and recession sharply increased the non-
profit sector's costs. But instead of attempting to remedy the result-
ing conditions, the Reagan Administration implemented its "New
t The author is indebted to Professor John G. Simon, who has provided invaluable
assistance and on whose ideas this paper is based.
1. Although there is much theoretical debate concerning which types of organiza-
tions are worthy of tax-advantaged status, this Current Topic focuses solely on those
nonprofit organizations which the Tax Code currently recognizes as worthy of the most
advantaged status. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1989). In this paper the term "charitable non-
profits" (or simply "charities") is used as a proxy for all organizations described in sec-
tion 501(c)(3).
2. This Current Topic addresses only the tax treatment of individual taxpayers.
Lending by corporate taxpayers such as banks and insurance companies poses different
and more complex tax questions that are beyond the scope of this paper.
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Federalism" strategy, which exacerbated the harmful effects of the
rising costs. President Reagan's "New Federalism" sought to mini-
mize the involvement of the federal government in what the Admin-
istration considered to be state and local matters. This meant
turning over to state and local governments and to private nonprofit
organizations social services that the federal government had previ-
ously provided.3 It also meant reducing federal support for many of
the social programs provided by the nonprofit sector.4 Between
1982 and 1988, federal spending for social programs declined by an
estimated $101 billion.5
State and local governments, many of which have been con-
fronting financial crises of their own, have had difficulties offsetting
the reduction in federal funding.6 Government policies under the
Bush Administration have continued to injure nonprofit groups, de-
spite the President's call for "a thousand points of light" to help
deal with society's problems. 7
B. Inadequacy of Current Tax Benefits
The "New Federalism" and "Thousand Points of Light" pro-
grams reflect a desire to expand the role of the private sector in
providing social services. The federal government has traditionally
relied on the nonprofit sector to provide many important social
3. ABRAMSON & SALAMON, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND THE NEW FEDERAL BUDGET
50-52 (1986). See also Skloot, The Growth of and Rationale for, Nonprofit Enterprise in THE
NoNPROFrr ENTREPRENEUR 1, 1-2 (E. Skloot ed. 1988).
4. Ehrlich, 'Tis The Season for Charities to Worry, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 1, 1986, at 70;
ABRAMSON & SALAMON, supra note 3, at 50-52. See also Skloot, supra note 3, at 1-2.
5. This figure excludes health care programs, where Medicare and Medicaid have
boosted federal spending. Lawrence, From Nonprofit Service Providers, A Package to Create
Sources of Cash; Report Urges Stamp Surcharge for Charity, Business Tax Credits, Washington
Post, July 19, 1989, § 1, at A21 (citing estimate of Lester M. Salamon, director of the
Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies).
6. Federal Fund Loss Squeezes Springfield, UPI, Dec. 26, 1986. See also, Local Aid Cuts Force
Communities to Adapt, The Boston Globe, Oct. 22, 1989, Metro section, at 29; Homeless Aid
Bills Viefor Tight Federal Dollars, L.A. Times, Feb. 6, 1989, Part 1, at 19, col. 1. But seeJoel,
The State of the States: Time for a Bush Federalism Polity, 734 Heritage Foundation Reports
(1989).
7. See Government Penalizes Nonprofit Groups, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1989, § 4, at 26, col.
5 (letter to the editor from Allen R. Bromberger, director of the nonprofit law program
of the Council of New York Law Associates). Cf. Feder, Cutting Big Government, Round 2,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1989, § 3, at 4, col. 3 (city ed.) ("Leaders of nonprofit groups,
including some of those Mr. Bush has named as part of his thousand points of light, say
passive privatization is bound to continue if Mr. Bush tries to keep his pledge to reduce
the budget deficit without raising taxes."). But cf. Steinbach, Those Points of Light, 20
NAT'LJ. 3189 (1988) (statement of Bush aide Robert A. Mosbacher, Jr.) ("This [thou-
sand points of light strategy] is not an effort to shift problem solving off the back of
government or create unrealistic expectations that the private sector can fill in all the
gaps. The two sectors have to complement each other.").
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services.8 The government has used the tax system as a primary
means of subsidizing this sector.9 The current tax status of the non-
profit sector, however, does not adequately fill the void created by
the federal government's reduction in direct expenditures for social
services.' 0 In fact, the Reagan Administration's overhaul of the In-
ternal Revenue Code through the Tax Reform Act of 1986 pro-
duced changes in tax law that, although not aimed at charities, are
harmful to the charitable nonprofit sector."t A brief examination of
the current tax subsidies for charitable organizations reveals their
inadequacy.
1. The charitable contributions deduction. The charitable deduc-
tion, which allows certain contributions to be deducted from taxable
income, has not encouraged adequate support for charitable organi-
zations.' 2 Through 1986, private giving was not sufficient to fill the
gap created by government cutbacks.' 3 And after the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (TRA), it is even less likely that private giving will fill
that gap. The TRA increased the cost of giving to charities by: (1)
reducing tax rates, thereby decreasing the value of the charitable
deduction; (2) eliminating the charitable deduction for non-
itemizers; and (3) including gifts of appreciated property in the al-
ternative minimum tax (AMT).' 4
8. C. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 1 (1985). See also
Rudney, The Scope and Dimension of Nonprofit Activity, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK 55 (W. Powell ed. 1987) (observing that the nonprofit sector is con-
centrated in four areas of importance to most Americans: i.e., health care, education,
social services and religion).
9. Since the War Revenue Act of 1917, the federal income tax has provided a tax
incentive for charitable contributions. 3 VA. TAX REV. 229, 229 n.1 (1984). The policy
of exempting charitable organizations from taxation of income has its roots in the Brit-
ish Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601, and has been federal law, in one form or another,
in the United States since 1894. Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organiza-
tionsfrom Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L. J. 299, 301 (1976). The provision for the
charitable contributions deduction is contained in section 170 of the Internal Revenue
Code. The exemption provision can be found in section 501 of the Tax Code.
10. See ABRAMSON & SALAMON, supra note 3, at 65-81.
11. See Cerny, Survey of Changes in the Revenue Acts of 1986, 1987, and 1988 Affecting
Nonprofits, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 1989: CURRENT ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS 255
(Practicing Law Institute, Tax Law and Estate Planning Series, No. 287, 1989) (survey-
ing provisions of 1986 TRA specifically affecting tax exempt organizations).
12. Wash. Post, supra note 5. See also Museums Feel the Pinch of Tax Law Changes, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 3, 1988, § C, at 22, col. 3 (city ed.).
13. ABRAMSON & SALAMON, supra note 3, at 90.
14. Jones & Rosenthal, Tax Reform '86 Style Gets Racked Over at Hearing, 46 TAX NOTES
1230, 1230 (Citing testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee of Adam
Yarmolinsky, a board member of Independent Sector, a collection of about 700 non-
profit organizations). See also The Taxation of Nonprofit Organizations After TRA: Full Impact




As a result of these changes in tax law, per capita giving, though
increasing by 8.7% in 1985 and 11.2% in 1986, rose by only 1.4%
in 1987 and 3.21 in 1988.15 The latter increases did not even keep
pace with inflation, much less offset decreases in federal expendi-
tures for social services. Furthermore, the average contribution per
return from taxpayers most likely to donate-those earning $1 mil-
lion or more-declined by almost 55% between 1980 and 1987,
from $207,087 to $93,297.16
2. Exemption of income. Another tax benefit for nonprofits is
the exemption of their income from taxation. This benefit, how-
ever, has not been significant. Most nonprofits would have little tax-
able income if they were subject to taxation, rendering insignificant
the actual amount of support which tax exemption provides. 17
Moreover, if a tax-exempt nonprofit firm generates significant reve-
nue, that income may be deemed "unrelated business income" and
thereby subject to taxation.18
To finance rising costs and to sustain current levels of service in
the face of dwindling government support and inadequate tax subsi-
dies, nonprofit organizations have increasingly turned to "nonprofit
enterprise," commercial endeavors that generate revenue.' 9 A mu-
seum, for example, may operate a gift shop and use the profits gen-
erated to maintain exhibits or pay employees' wages. Unrelated
business income rules regulate nonprofit enterprise and provide
that any income from activities unrelated to the nonprofit organiza-
tion's purposes will be subject to taxation.2 0 Under IRS regulations,
if"an inappropriate amount" of a charitable organization's activities
is not in furtherance of its tax-exempt purpose, that organization's
tax exemption may be revoked entirely.2 ' These regulations make
"nonprofit enterprise" a risky venture, as far as a charity's tax status
is concerned. In addition, lobbying efforts of for-profit enterprises
that complain of unfair competition from the nonprofit sector have
prompted Congressional inquiries into the sufficiency of existing
law in this area.22 The current restrictions and severe penalties of
15. Jones & Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 1230.
16. Id.
17. Simon, The Tax Teatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Review of Federal and State
Policies, in TnE NONPROFIT SECTOR: RESEARCH HANDBOOK 67, 81 (W. Powell ed. 1987).
Professor Simon does not cite statistics supporting this assertion.
18. Hopkins, The Legal Context of Nonprofit Enterprise, in THE NONPROFrr ENTREPRE-
NEUR 11, 14 (E. Skloot ed. 1988), citing Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (1990).
19. Skloot, supra note 3, at 1-3.
20. Hopkins, supra note 18, at 14, citing Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (1990).
21. Id. at 16, citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(I)(c)(1) (1990).
22. Id. at 24-25. See also HousE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, DRAFT REPORT
DESCRIBING RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME TAX (UBIT),
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the unrelated business income rules, combined with the possibility
of even more restrictive regulations, make nonprofit enterprise an
unlikely solution to the financial crisis of the nonprofit sector.
3. Qualified 501(c)(3) bonds. One tax incentive particularly
pertinent to this Current Topic is the tax-exemption of the interest
on certain bonds issued by charitable organizations. Section 103, in
combination with section 145, of the Tax Code excludes from in-
come the interest on "qualified 501(c)(3) bonds." 28 501(c)(3) bonds
are publicly traded and are issued through state and local authori-
ties for the benefit of charitable organizations. These bonds, how-
ever, do not solve the borrowing needs of the charitable nonprofit
sector. The nature of the municipal bond market prevents non-
profit organizations from issuing small amounts of debt-less than
$5 million-through state or local governments.2 4 Nonprofit organi-
zations with relatively small borrowing needs therefore cannot take
advantage of the tax-exempt debt made available under sections 103
and 145. Although the procedure for issuing 501 (c) (3) bonds might
screen poor credit risks,25 it also effectively eliminates these bonds
as a means of financing for organizations with small borrowing
needs, even those with low risk of default. If, as this Current Topic
100th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 (1988), reprinted in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 1989: CURRENT
ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS 341, 462 (Practicing Law Institute, Tax Law and Estate Plan-
ning Series, No. 287, 1989).
23. The Code, with certain exceptions, excludes "private activity bonds" from the
tax-exempt treatment afforded State and local bonds. I.R.C. § 103(b)(1) (1989). Private
activity bonds are bonds issued through a state or locality, the proceeds of which are
used for various kinds of private investment. I.R.C. § 141 (1989). The Code makes an
exception for a category of private activity bonds called "qualified bonds" and exempts
interest on such bonds from taxation. I.R.C. §§ 141, 145 (1989). Under one of these
exceptions, a private activity bond which is a "qualified 501(c)(3) bond" enjoys tax ex-
empt treatment. I.R.C. § 141(e)(1)(G) (1989). A private activity bond is considered a
"qualified 501(c)(3) bond" if (1) all of the property acquired by the net proceeds from
such bond issue is owned by one or more section 501 (c) (3) charitable organization or by
governmental units, and (2) 95 percent or more of the net proceeds of such bond issue
is used for a tax-exempt purpose. I.R.C. § 145 (1989).
24. To access national markets meaningfully, the minimum size of a debt issue
needed is approximately $20 million. If marketed regionally, however, issues of $5 to
$10 million can be arranged. Telephone conversation with Wallace C. Turbeville, Vice
President, Goldman, Sachs & Co. (Feb. 5, 1990).
25. The issuing agency has a significant incentive to, and, as common practice, al-
ways does, thoroughly investigate the ultimate borrower. This is because the state and
local agencies responsible for issuing 501 (c)(3) bonds bear the ultimate responsibility to
the bondholders. If the ultimate borrower is later found to have failed to meet the re-
quirements of section 145, the tax exemption of the bonds will be revoked. Telephone





proposes, improving the borrowing capabilities of the nonprofit sec-
tor is a practical means of addressing the financial crisis, it is an in-
adequate solution to facilitate borrowing for only those nonprofits
large, sophisticated, or powerful enough to issue large amounts of
public debt.
II. The Case for Tax Incentives for Lending to Charities
The present array of tax benefits for charitable organizations has
not filled the funding gap created by government cutbacks and
changes in the tax law. However, creating a tax incentive for lend-
ing to charities would be a viable means of filling this gap.26 Such a
solution would be consistent with the "New Federalism"/"Thou-
sand Points of Light" privatization of social services and would pro-
vide essential support for nonprofits who assume the social service
burdens previously borne by government.
Thus far, this Current Topic has assumed that the nonprofit sec-
tor's financial distress should be a cause of concern for the federal
government. This presumes, however, that the nonprofit sector is
worthy of government support. One could argue that the fiscal
problems of the nonprofit sector indicate that its economic costs
outweigh its benefits and, therefore, that government should allow
the free market to take its course. However, the legislative history
of the Tax Code, the history of nonprofit tax policy in general, and
the weight of tax scholarship suggest otherwise. They indicate that
the favored tax status of charitable organizations is based on a pol-
icy decision recognizing that charities perform important functions
and are therefore worthy of support."7 Three rationales for the tax
26. Because of the scarcity of economic research, it is difficult to generalize about
solutions to the financial problems of the nonprofit sector. Unfortunately, there are no
statistics available that reveal whether a shortage of debt is a component of the nonprofit
sector's financial distress. Although no research in the field is conclusive, this Current
Topic posits that an incentive that promotes private support of charitable organizations
through lending would help ease the burdens assumed by the nonprofit sector.
27. Simon supra note 17, at 68. But see Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 9, at 304.
Professors Bittker and Rahdert argue that exemption of nonprofits follows from the
Code's definition of income, and not from any normative policy goals for the nonprofit
sector. Their theory is grounded on the principle that receipts that do not represent
income should not be subject to income tax.
According to another version of this tax base defining rationale, the charitable contri-
butions deduction is not the result of a decision to subsidize nonprofits. Rather, charita-
ble contributions are deducted because, based on norms of taxation, they cannot be
included in the tax base of the donor. For tax purposes, income is customarily defined
as the sum of consumption plus accumulation of wealth in a given period. With respect
to the charitable contributions deduction, the tax base defining rationale suggests that
the amount contributed to charity must be excluded from the tax base of the contributor
since this amount represents neither consumption nor wealth accumulation. Hence,
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status of the nonprofit sector are discussed below. Each of these
subsidy rationales logically extends to justify tax benefits that sup-
port the borrowing needs of charities.
A. Subsidy Theories
1. Public good theory. A public good is a service or product
that possesses two special qualities. First, a public good costs no
more to provide to an entire community than it does to one member
of that community. Second, once a public good is provided to one
person, others cannot be prevented from also enjoying it.28 Public
radio is an example of a public good provided by nonprofit organi-
zations. Ordinarily, a consumer whose benefits from a product ex-
ceed his costs is willing to pay for it. If the product is a public good,
however, the consumer has an incentive not to purchase it because
she would receive the benefits for free if any other consumer
purchases it. This "free rider" problem results in a consumer de-
mand unrepresentative of actual preferences. Since producers sup-
ply goods according to consumer demand, producers of public
goods provide a sub-optimal supply.
The optimal supply of a public good can be attained if govern-
ment induces consumers to "reveal their true preferences and [com-
pels them] to contribute to public revenues accordingly."' 29 This
rationale applies to nonprofit organizations. Since, according to the
public good rationale, these firms are in the business of providing
public goods, government intervention is appropriate to boost pro-
duction to the socially optimal level.30 Government may intervene
by subsidizing, through tax benefits, nonprofits' production of pub-
lic goods. The cost of this tax subsidy is shared by all taxpaying
members of the community, each of whom benefits from the public
goods.
The public good justification for the special tax status of certain
nonprofit activities can be extended to justify tax incentives for
lending to charity. Just as with existing tax subsidies, government
amounts donated to charity must, according to the internal logic of the Code, be de-
ducted from the tax base of the donor. See Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions
or Matching Grants?, 28 TAx L. REV. 37 (1972); Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal
Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972).
28. Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:
A RESEARCH HANDBOOx 27, 29 n.2 (W. Powell ed. 1987).
29. Goldberg, Equalization of Municipal Services: The Economics of Serano and Shaw, 82
YALE L.J. 89, 94 (1972), reprinted in ECONoMic FOUNDATIONS or PROPERTY LAw 249 (B.
Ackerman ed. 1975).
30. See Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Econ-





can compel the community to subsidize the cost of producing a pub-
lic good through a lending incentive. The existing tax incentives
subsidize the cost of equity (i.e., donations and retained earnings); a
lending incentive can subsidize the cost of debt.3 1
Though public good theory may justify government support for
some nonprofit activities, the federal government also subsidizes
nonprofits that do not produce public goods. For these nonprofits,
an alternative justification for government support is necessary.32
2. Capital formation constraint theory. Professor Henry
Hansmann has offered an alternative subsidy rationale which, unlike
public good theory, does not depend on the assumption that the
nonprofit sector is in the business of producing public goods. Ac-
cording to Hansmann, the exempt status of nonprofit organizations
results from the role nonprofit firms play in the market and the con-
straints on capital formation that role imposes.33 Hansmann sug-
gests that nonprofit organizations are a response to a market
phenomenon known as "contract failure."3 4 Contract failure occurs
when, due to the type of goods or services purchased or the condi-
tions under which they must be purchased, consumers have diffi-
culty (1) comparing quality among competitors, or (2) ensuring that
the service is actually performed after the purchase.3 5 Because of
this contract failure, consumers face an "inability to police produ-
cers by ordinary contractual devices."'3 6 Contract failure leads con-
sumers to purchase these goods from nonprofit firms, which are
constrained by law from distributing profits and therefore have less
incentive to exploit consumers.
Although the legally imposed "non-distribution constraint"37
removes a nonprofit firm's incentive for exploitive behavior, it also
hinders its ability to raise equity capital. Hansmann suggests that
the exemption of nonprofit organizations from income taxation
compensates for this disadvantage in capital formation.38
31. As discussed infra p. 22, in a noncompetitive market, a lending incentive might
not reduce the cost of debt. It would nevertheless benefit charitable nonprofits by in-
creasing the availability of debt.
32. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income
Taxation, 91 YALE LJ. 53, 68 (198 1)[hereinafter Exempting Nonprofits].
33. Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE LJ. 835 (1976).
34. Id. at 845.
35. Hansmann, Exempting Nonprofits, supra note 32, at 69 (Hansmann cites the exam-
ple of a consumer purchasing disaster relief from the Red Cross as a situation where
contract failure exists).
36. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 33, at 845.
37. Id. at 838.
38. Hansmann, Exempting Nonprofits, supra note 32, at 55.
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He claims:
Nonprofit organizations lack access to equity capital since, by virtue of
the non-distribution constraint, they cannot issue ownership shares
that give their holders a simultaneous right to participate in both net
earnings and control. Consequently, in raising capital, nonprofits are
limited to three sources: debt, donations and retained earnings.
These three sources may, in many cases, prove inadequate to provide
a nonprofit with all of the capital that it needs.39
Hansmann asserts that since debt, donations, and retained earnings
do not satisfy nonprofits' capital needs, exemption is justified as a
"subsidy to capital formation." 40  A natural extension of
Hansmann's theory supports other tax benefits that compensate
nonprofit organizations for financial handicaps resulting from the
non-distribution constraint.4 ' If the benefits of exemption do not
fully remedy the harm caused by the non-distribution constraint, ad-
ditional tax benefits may be necessary.
The charitable deduction, for example, enhances the ability of
charities to attract contributions. 4 2 This tax benefit, like exemption,
can supplement capital formation. If exemption does not suffi-
ciently counterbalance the effect of the non-distribution constraint,
the charitable contributions deduction can be justified by capital for-
mation constraint theory. Hansmann's theory can be extended to
justify a subsidy for lending to charities because nonprofits' ability
to borrow, like their ability to raise capital, is effectively limited by
the non-distribution constraint. Hansmann notes that:
the amount of debt financing that a nonprofit firm can obtain is pro-
portional to some extent to the amount of revenue it can derive from
retained earnings, since capital purchased with such earnings provides
an extra margin of security for the debt, and since the cash flow from
such earnings is evidence to lenders that interest payments on the debt
can be covered.4 3
Equity capital provides a margin of security for lenders. A lender
will rarely lend for the entire amount of a borrower's financing
39. Id. at 72.
40. Id. at 74.
41. Hansmann specifically restricts his argument to a rationale for exemption. He
asserts, -[T]he charitable deduction and the exemption raise different issues, and it
would be quite conceivable for the tax system to embrace one without the other."
Hansmann, Exempting Nonprofits, supra note 32, at 56. It is also conceivable for the tax
system to embrace both exemption and other tax benefits based on his theory.
42. See generally C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 8(discussing the general relationship be-
tween federal tax policy and charitable giving).
43. Hansmann, Exempting Nonprofits, supra note 32, at 73-74 (citing P. Ginsburg, Capi-





needs; lenders usually require a borrower to put up some of her
own equity as security for the loan.44 Since the non-distribution con-
straint hinders formation of equity, a nonprofit's ability to borrow is
thus also constrained.
3. Altruism Theory. Professor Rob Atkinson has recently pro-
posed an alternative subsidy theory which, unlike public good the-
ory and capital formation constraint theory, does not justify the tax
status of nonprofits as a consequence of market forces. Rather, a
non-economic factor, altruism, sets the nonprofit sector apart and
warrants special tax treatment.45 Professor Atkinson claims that
"the essence of altruistic organizations is the conferring of uncom-
pensated benefits." 46
Atkinson proposes that the attempt to characterize the nonprofit
sector as a remedy for market inefficiencies overlooks the most dis-
tinctive function of charities: the altruistic supply of goods and serv-
ices. Altruism theory justifies the exempt status of nonprofit
organizations as "a deliberate social policy choice that must be
made on non-efficiency grounds." 47 Favorable tax treatment of al-
truistic nonprofits is a subsidy for the "metabenefit" they provide:
altruism.48 According to Atkinson, private nonprofit altruistic orga-
nizations "offer significant advantages over individual altruism, par-
ticularly in achieving economies of scale and continuity over time,
institutional advantages that are not available through either for-
profit firms or government." 49 Altruism theory supports the
favorable tax treatment of nonprofit organizations since such treat-
ment subsidizes their altruistic production of goods and services.
If altruism theory is accepted, a convincing case could be made
for providing a tax incentive for lending to charity. Lending, like
giving, supports altruistic organizations. Any tax benefit that en-
courages lending to charity will decrease the cost or increase the
44. A lender may sometimes allow a deeply subordinated loan to serve as security;
however, this subordinated loan represents a borrowing need subject to equity require-
ments of other lenders.
45. R. ATKINSON, ALTRUISM IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 129-130 (Yale University,
Program on Non-Profit Organizations, Working Paper No. 145, 1989).
46. Id. at 69.
47. Id. at 130.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 12. Atkinson concludes that nonprofits can achieve economies of scale and
produce a given good or service more cheaply than for-profit firms because nonprofits,
unlike for-profits, can avoid the cost of capital. Atkinson also concludes that nonprofits
have institutional advantages over government in catering to individual tastes, in part
because nonprofits are not handicapped by bureaucracy or majoritarian constraints of
collective decision-making. Id. at 75-85.
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availability of borrowing, thereby promoting the welfare of charita-
ble organizations. 50
B. Rationale for Tax Incentives for Lending to Charities
Subsidy theories justify government support for charitable orga-
nizations; however, in order to justify the proposed tax incentive for
lending to charities three questions must be answered affirmatively.
First, since it is feasible that direct subsidy payments to chariti.:s
could provide financial relief, should such support be provided in-
stead through the tax system? Second, are subsidies that support
debt needs an appropriate strategy for relieving the charitable non-
profit sector's distress? Finally, will providing tax incentives to indi-
viduals support the debt needs of charitable organizations? 5'
1. Why support should be provided through the tax system. Even if
providing additional government support is justified by subsidy the-
ories, it is not necessary that this support take the form of tax subsi-
dies. Direct government subsidies, for instance, might be the best
method of providing support. In general, however, government
support of the nonprofit sector has traditionally been accomplished
through the tax system. The current system of tax subsidies for
charitable organizations is favored over direct budget expenditures
because it: (1) "permits decentralized decision making through indi-
vidual taxpayer choice," 52 and (2) precludes tyranny of the majority
by making the subsidies equally available to all charities. 53 For the
same reasons, subsidizing the debt needs of charitable organizations
is best achieved through the tax system. Tax subsidies permit indi-
vidual lenders and borrowers, rather than legislators, to determine
the timing and amount of debt. Tax subsidies also prevent
majoritarian selection of those charities that will receive support.
50. See infra p. 22.
51. Clotfelter's economic analysis suggests that, with respect to charitable contribu-
tions, a tax deduction results in a greater amount being donated to charities than is
foregone in tax revenues. C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 8, at 273-79. See also Jencks, Who
Gives to What?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 321, 328 (W. Powell
ed. 1987). Similarly, it may be possible that more lending would be encouraged by pro-
viding tax benefits to lenders than would be encouraged by direct payments to nonprof-
its to defray interest expenses. Whether this is true can only be answered by as yet
unperformed economic analysis.
52. Simon, supra note, 17 at 78 (citing Hochman & Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treat-
ment of Charitable Contributions, 30 NAT'L TAXJ. 1, 2-3 (1977) (recommending a tax credit
as a means of subsidizing the nonprofit sector)).




2. Why support for borrowing needs of charities is appropriate. As
the balance sheets of virtually all successful for-profit firms indicate,
debt is vital to the efficient operation of a business. Debt financing
allows a company to leverage off its equity and raise the capital nec-
essary to finance projects it could not otherwise afford. For exam-
ple, a hospital with plans to undertake a $10 million renovation may
not be capable of raising more than $2 million of equity. With that
$2 million of equity, however, the hospital can borrow $8 million of
debt to finance the project. Similarly, a nonprofit can leverage off
its equity through the use of debt.54 While additional government
support of private giving might raise the equity holdings of nonprof-
its, a lending incentive can provide access to significantly more capi-
tal through leveraging. Thus, if government makes borrowing more
accessible, it will enhance the ability of charitable organizations to
pursue their projects.
Encouraging lending is sensible also because some benefactors of
charity may prefer lending to giving. Some taxpayers may have
reached their limit for contributing in a given year, but may still
have an ability and a desire to provide additional support.55 Conse-
quently, a combination of giving and lending incentives may be the
best means of fully exploiting the supportive resources of the pri-
vate sector.
Still, one could argue that the reason borrowing is difficult for
charitable organizations is that charities do not represent the high-
est and best use of debt. This argument claims that incentives to
encourage more lending would be inefficient. Charities, however,
may be unable to pay the market rate for reasons unrelated to their
ability to use debt efficiently. Specifically, charities may suffer from
free rider problems associated with the business of selling public
goods. 56 This implies that charitable organizations cannot pay the
market rate because they produce public goods-not because they
use debt inefficiently. Alternatively, charities may be unable to pay
the market rate for debt because legal constraints imposed on non-
profit organizations prevent them from raising sufficient amounts of
54. A nonprofit's equity consists of donations and retained earnings. Although
these sources of capital are referred to here as equity, technically, they cannot be consid-
ered equity because a nonprofit is prohibited from distributing earnings to its financiers.
55. This ceiling on a taxpayer's willingness to give may be the result of either legal
limits on deductibility of contributions, or personal preferences.
56. Although many people benefit from the operations of a charitable organization,
not everyone pays for the benefits he or she receives. For a discussion of the free rider
problem, see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. If all beneficiaries paid for the
services they enjoyed, charities might have sufficient resources to pay the market rate for
debt.
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equity.57 The restrictions placed on a charitable organization's abil-
ity to distribute profits may inhibit its ability to raise the equity re-
quired by lenders as security for their loans. Under either
explanation, charities may be a better use of debt than their present
ability to pay indicates.
3. How tax incentives for lenders will support charities. Tax incen-
tives for lenders will subsidize charitable organizations in much the
same way current tax benefits do. A tax incentive for lending would
encourage individual taxpayers to lend to charity by increasing their
rate of return. The increased rate of return would encourage more
taxpayers to lend. In a perfectly competitive market, the resulting
increase in the supply of debt would lead to a decrease in the cost of
borrowing. Ultimately, the entire value of the tax benefit would be
passed on to the charities that borrow. If, on the other hand, the
market for loans to charities is not perfectly competitive, the
number of individuals willing to lend to charities would still in-
crease, although the cost of borrowing might not decrease by the
full amount of the tax benefit. Nevertheless, this growth in the sup-
ply of lenders would, assuming a shortage of debt, benefit the chari-
table nonprofit sector.58 Thus, a tax incentive for lending would
subsidize charities by increasing the availability of debt financing,
reducing its cost, or both.
C. Principles of Taxation
Each subsidy theory discussed in section A can be extended to
justify a tax incentive for lending to charitable organizations. More-
over, section B demonstrates that a tax incentive for lending is a
rational way to address the financial distress of the charitable non-
profit sector. Nevertheless, any lending incentive must be recon-
ciled with established principles of taxation. Lending incentives
raise concerns with respect to three of these principles: (1) that the
57. See discussion of Hansmann's theory supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
58. The foregoing analysis focuses solely on economic return. This may be inappro.
priate to the extent that individuals who lend to charity have mixed economic and altru-
istic motives for lending. For these lenders, an incentive is likely to encourage below
market rate loans. This is because an individual who needs no incentive to lend to a




tax system should rot provide benefits to individuals who have sac-
rificed nothing for charity, 59 (2) that there should not be a deduc-
tion for amounts loaned because loans do not decrease wealth, 60
and (3) that all income as defined by the Code, including interest on
loans, should be subject to taxation. 6' Exceptions to these princi-
ples, however, are frequent.
1. No tax benefits if nothing sacrificed. One fundamental objec-
tion to tax incentives for lending is that individuals lend money be-
cause they are paid interest, and thus any additional incentives are
superfluous and an improper use of tax dollars. In other words, the
tax system should not give charity-related benefits to a taxpayer
who, because she has earned interest, has sacrificed nothing for
charity. This argument, however, begs the question of whether, on
a macro level, the compensation is adequate. Even if a particular
individual has not sacrificed anything, incentives may still be neces-
sary where the level of lending to the nonprofit sector is sub-opti-
mal.6 2 Tax incentives may be an appropriate way to encourage a
healthy supply of debt to the nonprofit sector, despite the rewards
that such incentives may confer upon lenders who have sacrificed
nothing.
The principle of no reward for no sacrifice implies that equal re-
wards should be provided for equal sacrifices. However, the Code
already disproportionately rewards benefactors of charity. An indi-
vidual who contributes certain kinds of appreciated property to
charity does not pay tax on the gain, and she can deduct the full
appreciated value of the property contributed. 63 A taxpayer who
contributes unappreciated property does not enjoy that benefit. For
example, if a taxpayer in the 28% bracket donated to a museum a
painting worth $100 that she purchased for $10, she would escape
tax on the $90 of gain (a benefit worth $25.20) and would receive a
deduction for the full $100 value (a benefit worth $28). If a similarly
situated taxpayer had worse luck in the art market, but still wanted
to bestow a benefit of $ 100 on the same museum, he might donate a
59. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989) (holding that tax-
payers were not allowed a charitable contributions deduction for payments made to the
Church of Scientology where the taxpayers received services in exchange for their
payments).
60. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 9.
61. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (1989).
62. Many individuals do sacrifice by lending to charity at below market rates. Just as
taxpayers who make contributions to charitable organizations are rewarded, these below
market rate lenders should be rewarded at least with respect the amount of interest they
have effectively donated to charity.
63. I.R.C. § 170(e) (1989).
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painting worth $100 that he purchased for $100. As with the first
taxpayer, his donation would result in no capital gain, and a $100
deduction. But since the dollars he paid for the painting were after-
tax dollars, the second taxpayer, unlike the first, has effectively paid
taxes on $100 of the value of his painting. Because of the appreci-
ated property rule, the first taxpayer has escaped tax on all but $10
of the value of her painting. Although both taxpayers sacrificed
$100 paintings, one taxpayer has reaped a greater reward.
The appreciated property provision remains in the Code, despite
its apparent violation of an accepted principle of taxation, since it
provides a great incentive for wealthy benefactors to donate to char-
ities.64 Apparently, the policy decision to subsidize nonprofits over-
rides the fact that some taxpayers are rewarded more handsomely
than others for bestowing the same benefit on a charity. Thus, the
real principle at work here may be that when the result supports the
nonprofit sector, the general principle of rewarding in proportion to
sacrifice can be ignored.
2. No deduction without corresponding decrease in income. In gen-
eral, the underlying norms of the Tax Code do not allow the deduc-
tion of an item from the tax base unless that item reduces income, as
defined for tax purposes. 65 Income may be defined as the sum of
wealth accumulation and consumption in a given period. 66 In order
to qualify for a deduction, a loan to charity must somehow decrease
the lender's wealth without concurrently increasing her consump-
tion. According to this definition, the lender to charity has not actu-
ally reduced her wealth. The loan is not regarded by the Code as a
decrease in wealth because it is exchanged for the borrower's obli-
gation to repay. This obligation is equal in value to the amount
loaned and thus the lender suffers no net decrease in wealth. A loan
to a charitable organization, therefore, does not merit a deduction,
since it does not represent an actual decrease in the lender's
income.
Although principles of taxation militate against deductions for
loans, there are some exceptions. The charitable contribution de-
duction, for example, rewards those who support charitable organi-
zations with their contributions, and thereby subsidizes the
64. See, e.g., Report of the Association of American Universities, Tax Reform and the
Crisis of Financing Higher Education, 8 (1973), reprinted in M. GRAETz, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 490 (2d ed. 1988).
65. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 9.
66. The Tax Code implicitly accepts this conceptualization-known as the Haig-




charitable nonprofit sector.67 A deduction for lenders to charities
would similarly subsidize the nonprofit sector by encouraging indi-
viduals who support the nonprofit sector. Just as subsidy theories
justify the tax status of nonprofits as a rational exception to princi-
ples of taxation, they also justify deductions for lending.
Other areas of the Tax Code also contain exceptions to the princi-
ple that deductions are allowed only when income has been re-
duced. For example, Section 169 allows a taxpayer to amortize
rapidly the cost of certain pollution control facilities in lieu of nor-
mal depreciation. 68 The allowable deduction will generally exceed
any proportionate decrease in value of the facility. This exception
to the principle that deductions must correspond to decreases in in-
come is nevertheless accepted as an incentive for investment in cer-
tain types of assets. A deduction for loans to charity could likewise
be viewed as an incentive for investment in charity.
3. All income is subject to taxation. According to principles of
taxation, income from any source is taxable. 69 It follows that interest
income, since it represents an increase in wealth, must be subject to
taxation. 70 The Tax Code, however, treats interest income differ-
ently depending on its source. For example, the Tax Code excludes
from income the interest on state and local bonds. 71 Moreover, as
discussed earlier, Congress has allowed exemption of interest in-
come on certain bonds issued by charitable organizations.72 Despite
purported principles of taxation, Congress already subsidizes nu-
merous types of borrowing in violation of those established norms,
including borrowing by some charitable organizations. Thus, the is-
sue here is ultimately not one of principle, but policy.
III. Proposed Tax Incentive Schemes
There are numerous ways to design a tax incentive to encourage
lending to the charitable nonprofit sector. This section introduces
and compares three possible schemes: (1) exempting interest on
loans to charitable organizations, (2) deducting interest foregone on
67. But see Andrews, supra note 27 (arguing that the charitable deduction is not an
exception, but a logical result of the internal logic of the Tax Code).
68. I.R.C. § 169 (1989); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.169-1 to -4 (1990).
69. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (1989).
70. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
71. I.R.C. § 103 (1989).
72. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for discussion of tax treatment of "qual-
ified 501(c)(3) bonds."
429
Yale Law & Policy Review
below market rate loans, and (3) combining the first two ap-
proaches. 73 These schemes are not formal proposals for amending
the Tax Code; rather, they are intended as a starting point for con-
sidering the impact of lending incentives on individual taxpayers
and on charitable organizations.
A. Exemption of Interest on Loans to Charitable Organizations
As discussed earlier, sections 103 and 145 provide tax-exempt
treatment for certain types of "private purpose" bonds, including
those issued for section 501 (c)(3) charitable organizations. The pol-
icy judgment behind 501(c)(3) bonds is clearly based on a subsidy
rationale.74 This judgment should apply equally to all lending that
supports worthwhile projects pursued by charitable nonprofits. Un-
fortunately, nonprofit organizations with relatively small borrowing
needs are unable to issue tax-exempt bonds. 75 The tax-exempt in-
terest approach would remedy this problem by providing a mecha-
nism that would, in effect, extend the Tax Code's treatment of
qualified 501(c)(3) bonds to any charitable organization, no matter
how small its borrowing needs2 6
Many of the possible complexities in implementing this scheme
already exist as part of the Code without posing catastrophic admin-
istrative problems.77 In addition, Congress has already approved the
extension of the subsidy rationale to justify incentives for lending to
charitable organizations through municipal bond issues. Imple-
menting the broader tax-exempt interest proposal is simply a matter
73. The viability of any of these schemes depends on the specific borrowing needs of
the charitable nonprofit sector and the impact that each incentive would have in foster-
ing increased lending. Presently, no studies are available that conclude whether the dis-
tress of the nonprofit sector includes an inability to raise debt or whether decreased
costs of borrowing and increased supply of debt will ameliorate the plight of charitable
organizations. The desirability of implementing the tax-exempt interest proposal, the
below market rate interest deductions, or a combination of the two, is dependent on the
results of much needed research into both the actual and the optimal supply of borrow-
ing by charitable organizations.
74. Discussing tax-exempt bonds, the Conference Report on the Tax Reform Act of
1986 states, "The conferees recognize that section 501(c)(3) organizations typically per-
form functions which governments would otherwise have to undertake." H.R. REP. No.
841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 687 (1986).
75. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
76. An extension of 501(c)(3) bonds should include a means of screening potential
borrowers similar to the procedure performed by the State or local issuing agency. See
supra note 25. Such a system could be prescribed in Treasury Regulations.
77. The schemes discussed herein would not, however, screen potential borrowers,
unlike the procedure for issuing "qualified 501(c)(3) bonds." See supra note 23. Any




of treating all riskworthy nonprofits equally, regardless of their bor-
rowing capabilities or political influence.
1. Tax effects. Under the tax-exempt interest approach, the in-
terest income from loans to charities would be exempt from taxa-
tion. For example, assume that a lender in the 28% tax bracket
extends a $1,000 loan to a charity at a 10% interest rate. Under the
current scheme, her income in the first year will be $100, or $72
after taxes. Under the tax-exempt interest approach the lender's
$100 interest income would be exempt and her after-tax yield would
be $100, or 10%. In the first year of the loan the value of this tax
benefit would be $28.
In a competitive market, the benefit of exempt interest would be
passed through to borrowers, lowering their cost of borrowing. The
increased return would attract more lenders and thus increase the
supply of debt. The increase in supply would, in turn, drive down
interest rates, which would directly benefit the borrowing charities.
Even in a non-competitive market, this lending incentive would at-
tract more individuals to lend to charity, which would also support
the charitable nonprofit sector as a whole.
2. Inadequacies. Although the tax-exempt interest scheme
would encourage more individuals to lend to charity, it would not
necessarily promote low interest rate lending. In fact, the tax-ex-
empt interest scheme might create an incentive to lend to charities
at high rates, since lenders who charge a higher interest rate would
receive a greater benefit from tax exemption. If the lender in the
previously example had charged 11% on her $1,000 loan, the value
of the tax benefits would have been $30.80, $2.80 greater than for a
10% loan. This problem could be ameliorated by placing a ceiling
on the amount of interest exempted. If the tax-exempt interest
scheme imposed a 10% ceiling, for example, all interest income in
excess of 10% would be taxable.
A problem still remains, however, for those who lend at below
market rates. An interest rate ceiling does not encourage lending at
below market rates. Under the tax-exempt interest scheme, a 5%
lender would, regardless of the ceiling, receive a smaller benefit
than would an 8% lender. Thus, the more altruistic the lender, the
smaller the benefit she would receive.
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B. The Below Market Interest Deduction
The Code currently exempts from taxation the imputed interest
on below market rate loans to charitable organizations. 78 In other
words, the interest income that a lender chooses to forego is exempt
from taxation. This provision is not, however, an incentive to en-
courage lending to charity. Rather, it is a means of avoiding the
disiacentive that would result from taxing imputed interest income.
While a market rate lender may pay the taxes on interest income
out of the interest she earns, a below market rate lender may not
have earned enough (or any) interest to cover taxes imposed on im-
puted interest income. For example, assume a charitable lender in a
28% tax bracket lends $1,000 to a charity at 10%o, the market rate.
She will have $100 in interest income in the first year of the loan and
will owe $28 in taxes. She can pay her tax bill out of the $100 in
interest income and be left with $72. If a similarly situated lender
extends a $1,000 loan at 1% to the same charity, his earned income
is $10 and his imputed income is $90 (i.e., he has chosen to forego
$90 of income). If he were taxed on both imputed and earned in-
come, he would, like the market rate lender, have a tax bill of $28.
However, he would only have $10 in earned income to cover the tax
bill, leaving a deficit of $18.
Exemption of imputed interest on loans to charitable organiza-
tions avoids this problematic result.7 9 Since the below market rate
lender is taxed only on earned income, his tax bill is $2.80, which he
can pay out of the $10 he actually received. Although the policy of
exempting imputed interest income avoids punishing the below
market rate lender, it does not affirmatively reward him for forego-
ing interest income for the benefit of charitable organizations.
78. I.R.C. § 7872 (1990), Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T(b)(9) (1990). Although the gen-
eral purpose of Section 7872 is to prevent tax avoidance by taxing the imputed interest
income on below market rate loans, section 7872 and the regulations thereunder effec-
tively provide for the exemption of imputed interest on loans to charitable organiza-
tions. This policy of exemption of imputed income from charities also applies to the
imputed income from voluntary services. That is, when a taxpayer donates services to a
charity, she is not taxed on the imputed income from those services. Furthermore, no
deduction is allowed for contribution of services. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A- 1(g) (1990).
79. This result is only problematic where the borrower is a charity. Where the bor-
rower is an employee of the lender, for example, and the purpose of the below market
rate loan is compensation, the Code taxes the lender/employer on his imputed interest
income. See discussion ofI.R.C. § 7872, supra note 78. This taxation of imputed interest





A below market rate lender provides more support to the bor-
rower than does a market rate lender.8 0 A deduction for foregone
interest would encourage taxpayers to lend to charitable organiza-
tions at below the market rate.
1. Tax efects. The below market interest deduction would
provide the lender with a deduction in the amount of the interest
she has foregone. If, for example, the annual market rate is 10%
and a lender in the 28% bracket extends to a charitable organization
a $1,000 loan at 1%, under the below market interest deduction she
would receive a deduction of $90 in the year the loan was made.
This amount represents the difference between what she could have
earned at the market rate and what she actually charged the bor-
rower. The lender enjoys a double benefit because, in addition to
escaping tax on $90 of imputed interest income, she receives a $90
deduction.
The lender in the above example has interest income of $10
which is worth $7.20 after taxes. She also receives a $90 below mar-
ket interest deduction, which, if charged against other income, is
worth $25.20. While the borrower has paid the lender only a 0.72%
after tax interest rate, the lender has effectively earned a 3.24% af-
ter tax return because of the below market interest deduction. 8 1
Unlike the exempt interest approach, the below market rate de-
duction provides a greater benefit to those who lend at lower rates.
Thus, if the lender in the above example had charged a higher inter-
est rate, she would have received a smaller tax benefit. Under this
scheme (assuming a 10% market rate) the deduction for a 1% loan
is worth $25.20, the deduction for a 5% loan is worth only $14, and
there is no deduction at all for a 10%, market rate loan.
2. Inadequacies. The below market interest deduction may fail
to satisfy an essential objective of lending incentives: promoting in-
creased lending to the charitable nonprofit sector. Specifically, the
80. According to the Talmud "He who lends without interest is more worthy than he
who gives charity and he who invests in the business of a poor man is the most worthy of
all." Quoted in THE BOOK OF UNUSUAL QUOTATIONS 200 (R. Flesch ed. 1966).
81. A variation on this approach would be to provide the lender with one, larger,
deduction at the time the loan is made. This would be accomplished by giving the
lender a deduction for the present value of all the future foregone interest, discounted
at the market rate. Thus, in the case discussed herein, if the lender extended her $1,000
loan to be repaid at the end of five years, her current deduction would be $341.17 This
equals the present value of $90 per year for five years, discounted at 107. Another way
of expressing this number is as the difference between the present value of the debt
service payments discounted at the below market rate charged and the present value of
those payments discounted at the market rate (i.e., $1,000 - $658.83).
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below market rate lending incentive does not provide any tax bene-
fits to market rate lenders, who may hold inuch of the capital avail-
able to charitable organizations.
The tax-exempt interest proposal was defective in that, although
it offered an incentive for lending to charitable organizations, it of-
fered no incentive for lending at low rates. The below market inter-
est deduction, on the other hand, does offer an incentive for lending
to charities at low rates; however, it offers no incentive for market
rate lenders, and therefore may result in only a small increase in the
supply of debt available to the charitable nonprofit sector. If the
purpose of providing a lending incentive though the tax code is
merely to reward those who sacrifice for the benefit of charity, then
the below market rate interest deduction is appropriate. If, as is
more logical, the goal is to increase the amount of debt available to
charitable organizations, then an incentive for market rate lenders,
like the exemption of interest income, may be necessary.
C. Combined Exemption and Deduction Approach
It is, of course, possible to combine the preceding goals. We may
want both to reward below market rate lending and to encourage
market rate lending. The combined approach offers both exemp-
tion of interest income on loans to charity and a deduction for the
amount of interest foregone. Assume, for example, the market rate
is 10% and a taxpayer in the 28% bracket lends a charitable organi-
zation $1,000 at 1%. In the first year of the loan the lender under
the combined approach would deduct $90 (foregone interest) and
receive $10 of tax free interest income. These tax benefits are worth
$25.20 and $2.80, respectively, totalling $28. The higher the inter-
est rate the lender charges, the lower will be her deduction for fore-
gone interest. But this is offset by the increased amount of taxes
saved on exempt interest income. If, for example, the lender
charged 3%, her deduction for foregone interest would be worth
only $19.60 but the exemption of interest earned would be worth
$8.40, totalling, again, $28. Under the combined approach, regard-
less of the interest rate (assuming it is equal to or less than the mar-
ket rate) the lender will receive the same amount of tax benefits.
Thus, the combined approach provides the same benefit to both






In the shadow of a huge federal budget deficit, proposals that re-
duce tax revenues are generally unappealing. In the case of the pri-
vate nonprofit sector, however, such proposals are worth
considering because the aggressive cutbacks in federal spending on
social services has expanded the importance of this sector. The phi-
losophies underlying the "New Federalism" and the "Thousand
Points of Light" suggest that additional support for nonprofits
should come from the private sector. But largely because of the
TRA's decrease in tax rates, charitable donations are not keeping
pace with the needs of charitable organizations. Indeed, the finan-
cial condition of the nonprofit sector indicates that government has
gone too far in privatizing social services.
Tax incentives for individuals represent the necessary spirit of co-
operation between federal and private support of the nonprofit sec-
tor. Such incentives send a signal that if individuals do their share
to support charitable organizations, the federal government will do
its share as well. Recently, individual support of the nonprofit sec-
tor has been insufficient. This does not mean that government must
assume complete responsibility for services provided by the non-
profit sector. Instead, it may be a warning that the federal govern-
ment must devise new ways to stimulate private support.
Implementing a tax incentive for those who lend to charity is an
expedient partnership of private and government support that will
help sustain the charitable nonprofit sector.
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